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What am I and What am I doing?1 
 
1. Introduction 
There is a deep connection between Anscombe’s argument that “I” is not a referring 
expression and Intention’s account of those species of self-knowledge whose objects are 
our intentional actions and bodily movement: practical knowledge and knowledge without 
observation.2 Anscombe’s slogan “I do what happens” cannot be understood until we 
recognise that when E.A. utters that slogan she does not, in saying “I”, refer to herself.3 
The assumption that the so-called ‘no-reference thesis’ can be resisted while the account 
of action set out in Intention is embraced is based on a misunderstanding of argument of 
“The First Person” and the status of its conclusion; removing that misunderstanding helps 
to illuminate the concept of practical knowledge and brings into view a novel account of 
the relation between self-consciousness, agency and first-person thought.  
 
2. Some background on method 
Our starting point is with some background on method. One reason that philosophers have 
missed the connection between Anscombe’s philosophy of action and her view on “I”, is 
to be found in the way that they have approached Anscombe’s “The First Person”. When 
people speak of that paper they talk as if what Anscombe is trying to do in it is to compel 
her reader into accepting a radical “no-reference thesis” on pain of Cartesianism. This 
reflects the mind-set that everyone was going along quite happily with the perfectly 
plausible and in-good-order thesis that “I” is a referring expression—albeit one that 
produced some recalcitrant data and required some mildly elaborate bits of epistemology 
and metaphysics to fix-up—until Anscombe (following Wittgenstein) came along and 
tried to force us to give it up. “Well, we won’t!” is the natural response. Commentary on 
“The First Person” tends to contain lots of talk of “resisting”, “blocking” and of 
capitulation being “unnecessary”, alongside attempts to demonstrate that self-conscious 
self-reference is something that can be adequately theorised. There is also a lot of 
emphasis on how quiet, reasonable, plausible, intuitive and unassuming the view that “I” 
is a referring expression is, in comparison to the “radical”, “obscure”, “extraordinary” 
and “incredible” position that Anscombe attempts to compel us toward. The ‘reference 
                                                          
1 Thanks to John Schwenkler for inviting me to speak at the Interpreting Anscombe workshop at 
Florida State University, at which I presented an ancestor of this paper. And to the other 
speakers (Jennifer Frey, Richard Moran and James Doyle) and audience at that event. Thanks 
to Clare Mac Cumhaill for many illuminating and encouraging philosophical conversations. 
And thanks to Kim Frost and an anonymous referee for detailed and helpful comments and 
criticisms, to which I have not adequately responded. 
2 G. E. M. Anscombe, “The First Person”, in Samuel Guttenplan, ed. Mind and Language 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975), pp. 45-65. Reprinted in Anscombe, Metaphysics and the 
Philosophy of Mind: Collected Philosophical Papers Volume II (Blackwell, Oxford, 1981), pp. 
21-36. All page numbers refer to its 1981 reprinting. G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1951), 2nd Edition. 
3 Intention, p. 52. 
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view’ represents good old fashioned common sense and intuition: we are only to accept 
Anscombe’s radical revision as an absolutely last resort.4 
In fact, for all that it is treated as a truism to say that the ‘reference view’ is 
‘common sense’, it is more of a philosopher’s truism than something available to 
everyday reflection. The statement ““I” is the word each of us uses to refer to herself” 
is pretty much unintelligible to anyone who is not a philosopher. To borrow from 
Wittgenstein: someone who says that has already taken the “first step” in philosophy. It 
is true that Anscombe’s paper contains a reductio argument: she says “[I]f “I” is a 
‘referring expression’, then Descartes was right”.5 However, the centrality that this bit of 
her paper has acquired is undeserved and has had a very bad effect on people’s ability to 
see what Anscombe is saying in that paper and to recognise its significance.  
 
Thinking about the method of Intention can help to bring out what is wrong with this 
‘save our Intuitions!” attitude toward “The First Person” and allow us to begin to see the 
way of “get[ting] to understand self-consciousness” that Anscombe is offering.6 
 
Intention begins with Anscombe’s remark that we are “in the dark about the character of 
the concept” to which “intention” refers.7 The extent to which we were “in the dark” is 
quite clear by the end of the book. At the start, we were rather inchoately inclined to think 
that the concept of intention was the concept of something “in the mind”, something that 
caused or accompanied certain actions or events which, in virtue of being so caused or 
accompanied, were called “intentional”. By the end of the book, if we follow Anscombe, 
we come to see that the concept of intention is not one under which psychological states 
or occurrences fall. Rather the word “intention” refers to a concept that is the capacity to 
employ a particular “form of description of events”. Many predicative descriptions owe 
their meaning to that form (for example “sending for”) and many more can appear in it 
(for example, “offending”).8 To say “I intend to do such and such”, rather than “I will do 
                                                          
4 The conclusion is variously described as “bizarre” (José Luís Bermúdez, The Paradox of Self-
Consciousness (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1998), p. 16); “extraordinary” (Evans, The 
Varieties of Reference (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 215); and “startling” (W. W. 
Taschek “Referring to Oneself”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15, 1985, pp. 629–52: p. 
629). de Gayensford goes so far as to suggest as an explanation of Wittgenstein’s apparent 
agreement with Anscombe that “Wittgenstein ... is being mildly ironic” (Maximilian de 
Gayensford, I: The Meaning of the First-Person Term (Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 19). 
To deny that “I” is a referring expression is, complains Edward Harcourt, to put “a common-
sense view of … “I” … out of reach” (Harcourt ‘The first person: problems of sense and 
reference’, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 46 (2000), pp. 25–46: p. 45). John 
McDowell argues that we should “refuse to accept” Anscombe’s conclusion and sets about 
showing how we can “block the inference” that creates the dilemma between the reference 
thesis and Cartesianism (“Referring to Oneself”, in Lewis E. Hahn (ed.), P. F. Strawson, 
Library of Living Philosophers (Open Court), pp. 129-145: p. 133. This is merely a sample and 
readers will be able to call to mind numerous other instances of this attitude. 
5 Anscombe, “The First Person”, p. 32. 
6 Anscombe, “The First Person”, p. 25. 
7 Anscombe, Intention, p. 1. 
8 Anscombe, Intention, pp. 84-5. See Kurt Baier ‘Critical notice’, Australisian Journal of 
Philosophy, 38 (1960), pp. 71-81 and Rachael Wiseman, Anscombe’s Intention (London: 
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such-and-such”, is make it explicit that “to do such and such” appears in that form. This 
is something that may or may not be otherwise clear, as is shown by Anscombe’s: “I am 
going to be sick” and “I am going to fail this exam”.9  
 
A central methodological premise of Intention is that the character of a concept—the sort 
of capacity that a person with that concept has acquired—is not something that can be 
“read off” the linguistic data nor something that we should expect to be available to 
intuition.10 We display our grasp of the concept of intention—we exercise the capacity 
that it represents—when we say “That was an expression of intention” or “she pushed 
him intentionally” or “What was your intention in sending that letter?” We also display it 
when we act, reason practically or say what someone is doing. And also when we find 
others’ behaviour—including their verbal behaviour—intelligible or unintelligible, 
reasonable or irrational. But having the capacity to do something and being able to 
describe that capacity are quite different things. While Anscombe was writing Intention, 
her husband Peter Geach was writing Mental Acts; he recruits Aquinas to articulate a 
difference in the way that “complexity” can figure in the exercise of a capacity:  
 
When our understanding frames a proposition about the colour of the glass, it 
does not assert that this colour is complex, but on the contrary that it is simple.—
If, however, the qualification is taken to refer to the person who understands, then 
the statement is false; for the way it is with our understanding when we 
understand is different from the way it is with the thing we understand, in its 
actual existence. When our understanding understands things that are simple, it 
may understand them in its own complex fashion without understanding them to 
be complex.11 
 
If we locate the simplicity in the understanding and the complexity in the object of 
understanding then we will assume that the character of a concept is something we can 
get hold of intuitively and that the nature of the quality, state, property that the concept 
picks out is the difficult thing to grasp. This is to get things the wrong way around. 
  Anscombe’s brilliance—or, at least, one part of her brilliance—was to recognise 
that the capacity represented by “intention” could be revealed in all its complexity through 
a description of a special use of the question “Why?” Or, to put it another way, she 
realised that what a person with the concept of intention can do is take part in the highly 
sophisticated “Why?”-”Because…” language-game, and that this language-game is 
something that she could describe.  
                                                          
Rouledge), 2016. 
9 Anscombe, Intention, pp. 1-2. 
10 I am here attributing to Anscombe a view of concepts as capacities but I will not defend this 
attribution here. For a detailed presentation of the view of concepts I have in mind, see Peter 
Geach, Mental Acts (London: Routledge and K. Paul) 1957, esp. §5.  
11 Peter Geach, Mental Acts (London: Routledge and K. Paul) 1957, p. 40. 
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To be clear, in calling this a “language-game” I am not suggesting that the 
capacity is merely linguistic. Learning the “Why?”-“Because…” language-game is not 
like learning the alphabet. Anscombe, like Wittgenstein, was not interested in language 
as an “abstract symbolism”, nor even as the “production of words properly arranged into 
sentences on occasions we vaguely call ‘suitable’”.12 She was concerned with language 
as an activity rooted in, and revealing of, the structure of human life. As we will see later, 
investigating this part of our language—the part that is structured by the concept of 
intention—is part of an investigation of self-consciousness. 
 
Anscombe recognises that the fact that we find it intuitive or plausible to say something-
or-other about the character of a concept to which a word refers, is neither here nor there 
when it comes to the question of that concept’s character. Indeed, what we find intuitive 
or plausible to say is usually a reflection of “superficial grammar”—facts about the 
“production of words” and when their production would be “suitable”.  
 
Let me illustrate this with two quick examples from Intention, both from the near the start.  
Recall the opening sections of Intention in which Anscombe offers a definition 
of prediction: 
 
a man says something with one inflection of the verb in his sentence; later that 
same thing, only with a changed inflection of the verb, can be called true (or false) 
in the face of what has happened later.13 
 
She notes that on this definition, expressions of intention and commands will count as 
predictions. As we know, seeing this—that is, seeing that an expression of intention is a 
species of prediction, and seeing what is common between expressions of intention and 
commands—is crucial to her later exposition of expressions of intention for the future. 
But, Anscombe remarks, it is “natural to feel an objection both to calling commands, and 
to calling expressions of intention, predictions”.14 In the former case the objection is down 
to “superficial grammar”: commands are cast in the imperative rather than the indicative. 
The example “Nurse will take you to the operating theatre” removes this superficial 
difference: here is a set of words produced on an occasion that functions simultaneously 
as evidence as to what will happen, command and expression of intention. We can 
imagine a language in which the form “NN will do such-and-such” was used for all these 
sorts of expression (with “NN” being the name of the speaker when what was said was 
an expression of intention) but in which the distinction between these species of 
prediction was still marked in the ways that people responded to the expression, the 
                                                          
12 Anscombe, ‘The Question of Linguistic Idealism’ in Acta Philosophica Fennica, vol. 28, n. 1-
3 (1976), pp. 188-215: p. 204. See also Gordon Baker ‘Wittgenstein’s “Depth Grammar”’, 
reprinted in Katherine J. Morris (ed.), Wittgenstein’s Method: Neglected Aspects. Essays on 
Wittgenstein by Gordon Baker. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 73–91. 
13 Anscombe, Intention, p. 2. 
14 Anscombe, Intention, p. 4. 
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questions and justifications that were relevant, the sorts of institutions and social practices 
that existed, and—crucially for our current topic—the sorts of errors that it was possible 
for the speaker to make.15  
 Second, Anscombe points out that “it is often ‘odd’ to call [a man’s actions 
intentional]”. 
 
If I saw a man, who was walking along the pavement, turn toward the roadway, 
look up and down, and then walk across the road when it was safe to do so, it 
would not be usual for me to say that he crossed the road intentionally. But it 
would be wrong to infer from this that we ought not to give such an action as a 
typical example of intentional action.16 
 
If we attend only to “suitable occasions” for using the word “intentional” we will exclude 
from our investigation many cases where the concept is at work.   
  
Imagine someone responds to Intention by saying “We should resist Anscombe’s 
conclusion about the concept of intention because it goes against our intuitions about the 
meaning of the word ‘intention’”. And suppose that person set about showing that given 
certain sophisticated moves it would not be necessary to take Anscombe’s line—perhaps 
this person has been able to picture a state of mind with adequate complexity that is not 
obviously incoherent or inconsistent with the facts. This person’s attention would be 
myopically focussed on §19, and Anscombe’s argument by reductio that there can be no 
feature, I, which could play this role.17 Such a person would not have understood the 
project of the book.  
 
If the foregoing is right, it suggests we have been approaching “The First Person” in the 
wrong state of mind, philosophically speaking. When we focus only on blocking the 
reductio argument, we are like the reader of Intention who sets her sights solely on §19. 
Rather than expecting a “knock down argument” against the reference view, the essay 
should be read as we are to read Intention: as an investigation into the character of a 
concept and the capacity it represents, a concept about which we are “in fact pretty much 
in the dark”.18 That investigation takes in not just the “production of words” but “activities 
other than the production of language, into which a use of language is interwoven”. 
Taking that attitude toward that essay means that talk of things like “resisting the 
conclusion” are quite misplaced.  
 
My main concern in this paper is not, however, to highlight methodological connections 
between “The First Person” and Intention. The point of emphasising the shared 
                                                          
15 To be clear, to say that “NN” is the name of the speaker is not yet to say that when NN says 
“NN will do such-and-such” her name “NN” is employed as a name or in that utterance.   
16 Anscombe, Intention, p. 29. 
17 Anscombe, Intention, pp. 28-30. 
18 Anscombe, Intention, p. 1. 
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methodology is to remove some barriers I think have stood in the way of a proper 
appraisal of the connection between Anscombe’s account of the character of the concept 
of intention and her account of the grammar of the first-person pronoun. And this is really 
what I want to talk about. My thought is: once we have the character of the concept of 
intention in view it we can begin to see why Anscombe says, and what she means by 
saying, that our self-consciousness is manifested through our employment of sentences 
that “do not involve the connection of what is understood by a predicate with a distinctly 
conceived subject”.19 These parts of her work are connected because the linguistic 
practice described in Intention is a linguistic practice in which language is employed in 
just this way. To have the concept represented by the word “intention” is to have, among 
other things, the ability to speak of oneself using the first-person pronoun in ways that 
manifest self-consciousness. 
 
3. “Unmediated thoughts” 
It should not be especially controversial to suggest that there is a deep connection between 
the conclusion of “The First Person” and Intention’s account of how it is possible to know 
without observation what one is doing and to “do what happens”.20 “The First Person” 
uses an examination of just those first-person thoughts that are the subject of Intention to 
investigate the grammar of the first-person pronoun. The “I-thoughts” Anscombe 
considers in that essay are, she points out, “those relating to actions, postures, movements 
and intentions”.21 That is, just those first-person thoughts that belong to the class of things 
that a man knows without observation. She is clear too that it is no accident that she picks 
this class. Rather, she says that it is because “those thoughts both are unmediated, non-
observational, and also are descriptions (e.g. ‘standing’) which are directly verifiable or 
falsifiable about the person of E. A.” that they are well-suited to bringing into view the 
use of the expression “I”.22    
 
Toward the start of “The First Person”, Anscombe considers the possibility that our 
objections to calling “I” a name are based on superficial grammar. Is it the case, she asks, 
“that “I” is only not called a proper name because everyone uses it only to refer to 
himself?” This would make our objections to calling “I” a name similar to our objections 
to calling “Open the door” a prediction. To test this supposition she “construct[s] a clear 
case of such a name”.23 
                                                          
19 Anscombe, “The First Person”, p. 36. 
20 Much of the best work on Intention in recent years has begun with the thought that the book 
contains an account of a species of self-knowledge that can provide insight into the nature of 
self-consciousness and the self. See, for example, Sebastian Rödl’s Self Consciousness 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007); Michael Thompson, ‘Anscombe’s 
Intention and Practical Knowledge’ in Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby and Frederick Stoutland 
(eds), Essays on Anscombe’s Intention (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011), pp. 
198-210. However, this work proceeds on the mistaken assumption that the insight can be part 
of an account of self-consciousness on which the use of “I” is an act of self-reference.  
21 Anscombe, “The First Person”, p. 35. 
22 Anscombe, “The First Person”, p. 35. 
23 This example, it will be noted, focusses on the view that “I” is a name. It will no doubt strike 
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Imagine a society in which everyone is labelled with two names. One appears on 
their backs and at the top of their chests, and these names, which their bearer 
cannot see, are various: “B” to “Z” let us say. The other, “A”, is stamped on the 
inside of their wrists, and is the same for everyone. In making reports on people’s 
actions everyone uses the names on their chests or backs if he can see these names 
or is used to seeing them. … Reports on one’s own actions, which one gives 
straight off from observation, are made using the name on the wrist. […] It may 
be asked: what is meant by “reports on one’s own actions”? Let us lay it down 
that this means, for example, reports issuing from the mouth of B on the actions 
of B. That is to say: reports from the mouth of B saying that A did such-and-such 
are prima facie verified by ascertaining that B did it and are decisively falsified 
by finding out that he did not.24 
 
One of the things that is striking about the case as described is that in this imagined society 
reports of one’s own actions are given “straight off from observation”.25 But in Intention, 
Anscombe notes that descriptions of what one is doing are given “straight off without 
observation”.26 There is no argument in “The First Person” on this point; it seems to have 
been clear to Ansombe that the existence of a class of descriptions that are true of a man 
that he knows without observation is part of a linguistic practice in which first-person 
thoughts are expressed without acts of reference. If this is right, then far from being a 
feature of “superficial grammar”, our reluctance to call “I” a name is picking up on 
something deep about the difference between them. Namely, that “A” and “I” belong to 
different linguistic practices, and that the linguistic practice to which “I” belongs is 
connected to the linguistic practice described in Intention.  
                                                          
the reader that Anscombe must do more than show that “I” is not a name if she is to establish 
that it is not a referring expression; names are just one of the ways in which we refer and it is 
much more common to assimilate “I” into the category of demonstratives or indexicals than 
names. This point is well made and would be significant were the dialectic of “The First 
Person” as is traditionally presented. However, on the re-orientation I am proposing, the point 
of this example is to bring out an insight into the relation between the use of “I” and the 
expression of practical knowledge, an insight that reveals how deeply the use of “I” diverges 
from the use of expressions that are used to refer to objects of predication. Thanks to an 
anonymous referee for pressing me on this point.  
24 Anscombe, ‘The First Person’, p. 24.  
25 Note that seeing this passage in light of Intention rules out any interpretation of Anscombe on 
which the mark of knowledge without observation is that it is non-inferential (see, for 
example, Hanna Pickard, “Knowledge of Action without Observation”, Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society 104 (2004): pp. 205-230; Edward Harcourt, Harcourt “The first person: 
problems of sense and reference”, op. cit.). Anscombe’s meaning in calling “separately 
describable sensations” the mark of observation is not that the object of the sensation must be 
different from the object of knowledge; rather, it is a mark of observation that what is seen 
(heard, felt, etc) could be given using a description other than that giving the material object 
of sight (hearing, touch, etc.). See Anscombe, “Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical 
Feature”, in Butler, R. J. (ed.), Analytical Philosophy - Second Series (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1965), pp. 158-180.    
26 Anscombe, Intention, p. 14. 
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 Why is it that when Alice, in the A-practice says “A is replenishing the water 
supply”—and replenishing the water supply is a description of what she is doing—this is 
a “report made straight off from observation”; while when Ilana, in the I-practice says “I 
am replenishing the water supply”—and replenishing the water supply is a description of 
what she is doing—she says this “straight off without observation”? 
 To explain this we need to look at what Anscombe says about the class of things 
a person knows without observation and about the use of language that express that 
knowledge. Once we have that in view, we will return to “The First Person”.   
 
4. Knowledge without observation 
Anscombe introduces the class of descriptions that are true of a person that she knows 
without observation near the start of Intention. The context is the following: Anscombe 
wants to describe the distinction that we make when we say that a mention of something 
past gives a cause rather than a reason for what I did. When I say “I killed him because 
he killed my father”, the past event is (usually) a reason. When I say “I jumped because 
she banged the cymbals” the past event is (usually) a cause. (I say “usually” because we 
can imagine suitably unusual circumstances in which his killing my father caused me to 
kill him and in which her banging the cymbals was a reason for me to jump). Anscombe 
wants to describe this distinction without “begging any questions”. She says: 
 
This can be done as follows: we first point out a particular class of things which 
are true of a man: namely the class of things which he knows without observation. 
E.g. a man usually knows the position of his limbs without observation. It is 
without observation, because nothing shews him the position of his limbs.27 
 
With this distinction to hand, Anscombe is able to define the concept of a mental cause 
and make the distinction she is after.  
This part of her argument is not relevant for us now but I mention it to draw 
attention to the fact that the class—things which a person knows without observation—is 
introduced by way of an illustration. Anscombe does not hypothesise that such a class 
exists and nor does she argue that it does.  Just as the distinction between descriptions 
that are true of a person which she knows and those which she does not know is one that 
we are invited to recognise by way of an illustration (sawing a plank vs sawing Smith’s 
plank), so too with this distinction.  
Having introduced this class, the next ten sections of Intention systematically 
mark off classes of descriptions which belong to it but are not of intentional actions. The 
results, summarised in §16, are prima facie far from illuminating. Anscombe, you will 
recall, gives a rather dispiriting disjunctive set which includes descriptions of past history 
(so long as what is mentioned involved the ideas of good and harm); descriptions which 
interpret the action; and descriptions which mention something future.28 The work of 
                                                          
27  Anscombe, Intention, p. 13. 
28 Anscombe, Intention, p. 24. 
9 
 
§§18-27 is to reveal the unity of that disjunctive set by using the question “Why?” to 
reveal the “A-D” order.  
 
In §28, Anscombe says, quite suddenly:  
 
We must now look more closely into the formula which has so constantly 
occurred in this investigation: “known without observation”.29  
 
This is the first point at which the distinction introduced at §8 has been subject to scrutiny. 
 
This had its first application to the position of one’s limbs and certain movements, 
such as the muscular spasm in falling asleep. […] In enquiring into intentional 
action, however, I have used the formula quite generally, and the following 
objection will very likely to have occurred to a reader: “Known without 
observation” may very well be a justifiable formula for knowledge of the position 
and movement of one’s limbs, but you have spoken of all intentional action as 
falling under this concept. Now it may be e.g. that one paints a wall yellow, 
meaning to do so. But is it reasonable to say that one “knows without 
observation” that one is painting a wall yellow? And similarly for all sorts of 
actions: any actions that is that are described under any aspect beyond that of 
bodily movements.30 
 
This section marks the beginning of Anscombe’s discussion of practical knowledge and 
practical reasoning.  
 
What I want to draw attention to here is that Intention does not include an answer to the 
question “is it reasonable to say that one ‘knows without observation’ that one is raising 
one’s arm?” The reader is not expected to raise that worry; though Anscombe does 
acknowledge that “This topic is certainly a difficult one, deserving a fuller discussion”. 
Such a discussion, she says, “would be out of place” here.31 The worry that Anscombe 
does address is whether it is legitimate to say the same of descriptions that go beyond that 
of bodily movement. Her answer to that question is: yes—you will see that it is legitimate 
once you understand what practical knowledge is. And you will understand that once you 
drop some unfortunate assumptions about the character of practical reasoning. 
 
5. Practical Knowledge 
To understand what it would take to show that it was “reasonable” to speak of knowing 
without observation when the description goes beyond bodily movement, and why 
Anscombe says that the topic of knowledge of bodily posture and movement “would be 
                                                          
29 Anscombe, Intention, p. 49. 
30 Anscombe, Intention, p. 50. 
31 Anscombe, Intention, p. 50. 
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out of place” in Intention, we need to go back to the section in which Anscombe 
introduces the class of descriptions known without observation. Here is what she says: 
 
[W]here we can speak of separately describable sensations, having which is in 
some sense our criterion for saying something, then we can speak of observing 
that thing; but that is not generally so when we know the position of our limbs. 
Yet, without prompting we can say it. I say however that we know it and not 
merely can say it, because there is a possibility of being right or wrong: there is 
a point in speaking of knowledge only where a contrast exists between “he 
knows” and “he (merely) thinks he knows”.32 
 
When interpreters have examined this passage looking for—as Godfrey Vesey put it—
the “philosophical treasure” of an account of bodily self-knowledge which would reveal 
“the way in which the mind is embodied”, they have focused on the question: what does 
Anscombe mean by “separately describable sensations”. Also noted by Vesey is the fact 
that this treasure hunt “seem[s] to lead, not to philosophical treasure at all, but to … 
absurdity”.33 The problem is that Anscombe does not give any such account in Intention. 
What she describes instead is three features that make it appropriate to speak of 
“knowledge” in relation to a description which is employed by a subject “without 
observation”.  
 
1. The description is employed by a subject who has, and who is exercising, a 
“capacity to say” when they are as the description specifies (this rules out 
blurting out, guesses, speculation, etc.) 
2. The capacity to say is one that is unmediated by sensory input—which is to say, 
the capacity is one the exercise of which is independent of the exercise of 
sensory capacities (this is not, of course, to say that the acquisition of the 
capacity is independent of the possession of sensory capacities; nor that the loss 
of sensory capacities would not affect the possession and exercise of the 
capacity to say) 
3. What is said—the description that is given—is “also a description which is 
verifiable or falsifiable about the person whose saying it is”.34  
 
                                                          
32 Anscombe, Intention, p. 14. 
33 G. N. A. Vesey “Knowledge Without Observation”, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 72, p. 198-
212: p. 201.  
34 This shows why, as Adrian Haddock has pointed out, we might refrain from calling 
expressions of knowledge without observation “reports” (Haddock, ‘“The Knowledge That a 
Man Has”’, in Ford, Hornsby and Stoutland (eds), pp. 147-169: p. 158). These features are, I 
take it, compatible with his “general account of knowledge without observation: its 
possession does not require, in addition to the actuality of its object, that its possessor acquire 
… an observational reason that shows or suggests that its object is indeed actual” (p. 149). 
However, while Haddock’s focus on the “actuality of the object” invites speculation as to a 
special kind of causal process at work, nothing of the kind is suggested by (1)-(3). 
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Any capacity fitting this description will issue in utterances of the form “I am such-and-
such”. And where ‘such-and-such” is true of the person we will say: she knows she is 
such-and-such. And when we say “she knows she is such-and-such”, “such-and-such” 
will belong to “the class of things which [s]he knows without observation”.  
 In describing when we speak of knowing without observation what is left 
completely open by Anscombe is the nature and source of the capacity to say. Anscombe 
specifies the meaning of “knowledge without observation” while giving only a negative 
criterion of this capacity. She says only that the exercise of the capacity must not be 
mediated by the senses. But this in no way implies that whenever we speak of knowledge 
without observation we are speaking of the same capacity, a capacity that is common to 
all such cases. Rather, we may have—in fact we do have—many different capacities the 
exercise of which can be an utterance “I am such-and-such” that fits Anscombe’s formula. 
This explains why Anscombe says that the topic of knowledge of bodily posture 
and movement “would be out of place” in Intention. The capacities in question when it 
comes to saying how one’s limbs are arranged and moving are the sort of capacities that 
a baby lacks, a toddler is acquiring and most children have. We know a child has many 
of them when she can play “Heads, Shoulders, Knees and Toes”. We know she has some 
mastery when she can follow the order “Do a cartwheel”. 
 
The topic of Intention is not the capacity to say how one’s limbs are arranged and moving 
but the capacity to say what one is doing (intentionally). This is not to say that there is no 
connection: as we will see shortly, a person who lacked the capacity to say—without 
sensory mediation—how her limbs were arranged and moving would be severely 
restricted in her capacity to say—without sensory mediation—what she was doing 
(intentionally). However, the fact that the capacity to perform a synchronised swimming 
routine includes or presupposes the capacity to swim which presupposes the capacity for 
voluntary bodily movement does not imply identity. 
 
The discussion of practical knowledge begins when the interlocutor objects to 
Anscombe’s description of the application of the question “Why?” At the point at which 
the objection is made, Anscombe has already used that question as a tool to display the 
order that is there whenever the concept intention has application. The objection comes 
after the example of the murderous well-poisoner is used to excavate the “A-D order”.  
The objection is: you have taken for granted in displaying this order that 
descriptions which go beyond that of bodily movement can be known without 
observation. This was taken for granted, recall, because any answer to the question “Why 
are you doing such and such?” which showed that “doing such and such” was not known 
without observation instantly excluded the description doing such and such from the A-
D order. But why should we accept this criterion given that it seems quite incredible that 
a person could know without observation what they were doing? If it turned out at that 
any description that went beyond a description of bodily movement was thereby one that 
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could be known only by observation, then it would turn out that the question “Why?” 
could not, after all, be used to “display the order” to which “intention” refers.  
 Thus:  
 
“Known without observation” may very well be a justifiable formula for 
knowledge of the position and movement of one’s limbs, but you have spoken of 
all intentional action as falling under this concept. … But is it reasonable to say 
that one “knows without observation” … actions … that are described under any 
aspect beyond that of bodily movements?35 
 
The interlocutor is not asking here for an account of a capacity to say, without mediation 
by the senses, how one’s body is moving; she is asking instead for an account of an 
capacity to say, without mediation by the senses, what one is doing where “what one is 
doing” is, e.g. “replenishing a water supply” or “painting a wall”.  
Anscombe immediately answers:  
 
My reply is that the topic of an intention may be a matter on which there is 
knowledge or opinion based on observation, inference, hearsay, superstition, or 
anything else that knowledge or opinion are ever based on; or again matter on 
which an opinion is held without any foundation at all. When knowledge or 
opinion are present concerning what is the case, and what can happen—say Z—
if one does certain things, say ABC, then it is possible to have the intention of 
doing Z in doing ABC; and if the case is one of knowledge or if the opinion is 
correct, then doing or causing Z is an intentional action and it is not by 
observation that one knows one is doing Z.36 
 
In giving this answer Anscombe describes what it is for a person to have the capacity to 
say, without observation, “I am doing Z”, where “Z” is a description that goes beyond 
bodily movement.  
 
Take a case. If I am of the opinion that today is Thursday and of the opinion that a person 
who goes to the library on Thursday can cast her vote, then I can have the intention of 
casting my vote in going to the library today. If I do this and my opinion that today is 
Thursday and my opinion that a person who goes to the library on Thursday can cast her 
vote are correct then casting my vote is an intentional action and it is not by observation 
that I know I am casting my vote. What I say—“I am casting my vote”—is an expression 
of practical knowledge. Practical knowledge is the exercise a capacity to say that is not 
mediated by sensation. It is not mediated by sensation because the capacity I exercise is 
one that comes from “knowing my way about”—as Anscombe puts it:  
 
                                                          
35 Anscombe, Intention, p. 50. 
36 Anscombe, Intention, p. 50. 
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Although the term “practical knowledge” is most often used in connexion with 
specialised skills, there is no reason to think that this notion has application only 
in such contexts. “Intentional action” always presupposes what might be called 
“knowing one’s way about” the matters described in the description under which 
the action can be called intentional, and this knowledge is exercised in the action 
and is practical knowledge.37  
 
The exercise in action of “knowing ones way about” is practical knowledge. Practical 
knowledge can be expressed in an answer to the question “Why?”: “I am casting my 
vote”. Note that “I am casting my vote” can be an expression of practical knowledge even 
in the necessarily rare case in which “knowing my way about” with respect to voting does 
not result in my casting my vote. This is what makes it right to say that I know without 
observation I am casting my vote: if the exercise of the capacity to say left no “possibility 
of being right or wrong”—because whenever it was said it was right—then there would 
be no “point in speaking of knowledge”. 
 
6. Practical knowledge and reference 
I have argued that “non-observational knowledge” is not a label for an epistemological 
capacity, one that is so specialised it delivers knowledge of only one object—viz., me. 
Rather, we speak of a person “knowing without observation” in relation to a description 
which is employed by a subject whenever features (1)-(3) are present.  
This brings into view a rendering of Anscombe’s “paradoxical formula” “I do 
what happens”. When I am on my way to the library to cast my vote and I say “I am 
casting my vote” then what I say is—when I am able to say it because of my vote-casting 
capacity, which I am exercising—an expression of practical knowledge. I do. When you, 
looking on, can describe what is happening using the same description, “NN is casting 
her vote”, then what happens is what I do, and I know without observation what is 
happening.  
 
One advantage of seeing Anscombe’s views on “I” in the context of her account of 
practical knowledge is gets us away from the idea that rejecting the reference view leaves 
us with “I” as a simple or crude linguistic device: an obsolete term serving as nothing but 
a syntactic marker. Rather, what has happened is that a picture of “I”-use as involving a 
simple capacity (reference) with a complex object (self) has been replaced by a set of 
complex capacities the exercise of which is not mediated by sensation and so does not 
require picking out any object. A dummy-word would indeed not express self-
consciousness nor belong to a linguistic practice in which descriptions occur in the form 
of description “intentional action”. The use of a subject-term in expressions which do not 
involve predication is part of a highly sophisticated language-game. It is in that language-
game that we will locate the deep grammatical structure that underpins the “logician’s 
                                                          
37 Anscombe, Intention, p. 89. 
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rule”: If X asserts something with “I” as subject, his assertion will be true if and only if 
what he asserts is true of X.38  
 What would need to be spelled out to complete the description of that language-
game is the relation between saying how your limbs are arranged and saying what you 
are doing—what “what you are doing” is given in a description that goes beyond bodily 
movement. I do not have space to do that here, though above I gave a hint of the sorts of 
capacities that would be relevant. What needs to be noted is that a person who had only a 
very limited capacity to say how their limbs were—where this was not merely failing in 
the “production of words”— would be someone who had only a very limited capacity to 
move their limbs and to hold a posture. Such incapacity would impose serious limitations 
on that person’s agency. A person who had no capacity for movement or posture—whose 
body was radically beyond her control—could have practical knowledge only insofar as 
she could use others as the instrument of her agency by giving orders. The A-people, are 
all in such a position, and so there is no-one for them to give orders to. As a society they 
lack the concept intention.  
The capacities to say that are manifested in intentional action “do not involve the 
connection of what is understood by a predicate with a distinctly conceived subject”. 
Rather, they involve a subject doing what she understands by a predicate, and saying what 
she is doing. Anyone, including her, can “look and see” whether that person is as the 
predicate describes. In describing part of this language-game—the part that involves the 
concept intention Anscombe describes part of the capacity that we refer to using the 
description “self-conscious”. 
 
                                                          
38 Compare Geach, Mental Acts, ch. 26. 
